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Database Security
Most secure database systems have access control mecb niams based on the Bell-LaPadula model [12] . This model is specified in terms of subjects and objects. An object is a data item, whereaa a subject is a process that requests access to an object. For example, when a procem accesses a data file for input/output operations, the process is the subject and the data file is the object. Each object in the system has a classification level (e.g., Secret, Classified, Public, etc.) based on the security requirement. Similarly, each subject has a corresponding ciearance level baaed on the degree to which it is trusted by the system.
The Bell-LaPadula model imposes two restrictions on all data accesses: q A subject is allowed read access to au object only if the former's clearance is higher than or identical to the latter's classification. q A subject is allowed write access to an object only if the former's clearance is identical to or lower than the latter's classification. The Bell-LaPadula conditions, by enforcing a 'kead below, write above" constraint on transaction data accesses (an example is shown in Figure 1 ), prevent direct unauthorized sufficient, however. to 111 {)11,(1 froll] "( l)\(,l't (]lilIlll (>lS" .$ covert, channel M an m-/)t(,1 ]Ii{,<i[l> 1~, \vlliItl a hlgb security clearance process can i 1,Iilki(v mlol UMI,NM to a IOW security clearance process [11] , 1',)) vx.i]Iil)l( If ;i low wclirity l)rocess requests access to 'Ill (>.ILlllhl\l~I '(w) ul[ '{!. it will be delayed if the resource M ,111 (,lci\ 111,1{1 1)~a blgh se{:lult,v process. otherwise it will lmu[(,(ha t~l \, be granted the resource. The presence or absence (J t 11(,{Iclay ca:! he used to encode information by a high W (.urit .v process that is conspiring to pass on information to rll{, I{NVseclwity process.
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Covert channels based on data can be prevented by provldiug hv$wr prmritv to the low security transaction when-Ivtvii (Iiltil {mnflirt occurs between a low security transactwu and a lugh swxmty transaction. Taking this approach tIIIsliresthat low swwritv transactions do not "see" high sei.tirirs traluw:t,ions and are therefore unable to distinguish \,(vuwvt r.l~t~ir lwcsence or absence.
This notion is formaltz(>tlin /6) as ,rmn,-mterference. From a database system per->I]l,(tlvc. 1I translates to itnplementing a concurrency wntwl tuechanisrn that supports the non-interference feature. ]]! thw papf>r. we quantitatively investigate the performance i]!]jjli~.,~t Mmsof secure concurrency control in the context of ,! tirul-(I{w(llim' rwal-time database system. [4, 16, 17] , to ad-{Ir(,ss t,lw idwve pr(~blenl is to adaptively tradeofl security lor Iirllt,lilless depending on the state of the system. Our VI(OW. however. is that for many applications security is an illl-(,1-li{~t,lii!lg'" issue. that is, it is a correctness criterion. It] nmlpanson.
the numberof missed deadlines is aperfor-lnf~nw issll(,. Therefore, in our research work, weare investi-x~lrluk tlit' problem of how to minimize the number of missed transaction deadlines rmthout compromising security. As a first step towards achieving this goal, we have conducted a detailed simulation study to evaluate what impact the choice of concurrency control protocol has on the real-time performance. Our simulation model captures a real-time database system with an open transaction arrivaf process. Transactions are assigned security levels and have corresponding restrictions on their data accesses. Each transaction also has a deadline and the deadline is "firm" -that is, transactions which miss their deadlines are considered to be worthless and are "killed" (immediately discarded from the system without being executed to completion).
Secure Real-Time Concurrency Control
In recent years, several concurrency control (CC) protocols that are specially tailored for reaf-time database systems have been developed. These include prioritized variants of two-phase locking (2PL) such as Wait Promote and High Priority [3] , and prioritized variants of optimistic concurrency control (OPT) such as Sacrifice and Wait [9] . These algorithms were primarily designed to minimize the number of missed transaction deadlines and have been evafuated on this basis in [3, 9] .
There are significant differences between the real-time environment in which the above concurrency control algorithms were compared and the secure real-time environment. In particular, the following issues need to be considered: First, not all real-time concurrency control algorithms may satisfy the non-interference property mentioned earlier. Second, there are multiple transaction classes corresponding to the various security clearance levels. Third, the data access patterns of transactions are constrained by the Bell-LaPadula model. Fourth, conflicts are resolved baaed on both security considerations and timeliness considerations. Finafly, there is the question of class fairness, that is, how evenly are the missed deadlines spread across the transactions of the various clearance levels.
Due to the above differences, the performance profiles of real-time concurrency control algorithms need to be reevaluated in the secure domain -we address this issue here.
Dual Approach
A feature of the secure environment is that there are two categories of data con fhcts: inter-level and intra-level. Interlevel conflicts are data conflicts between transactions belonging to different security clearance levels whereas intra-level confhcts are data confllcts between transactions of the same level. The important point to note here is that only interlevel wnflicts can result in security violations, not intralevel conflicts. This opens up the possibility of using different concurrency control strategies to resolve the dfierent types of confhcts. In particular, we can think of constructing mechanisms such that inter-level conflicts are resolved in a secure manner while intra-level conflicts are resolved in a timely manner. The advantage of this dual approach is that the real-time database system can maximize the real-time performance, by appropriate choice of intra-level CC protocol, without sacrificing security. In contrast, the tradeoff approach mentioned earlier requires the application to compromise on security in order to achieve enhanced reaf-time performance. We investigate here the performance of various combinations of concurrency control mechanisms for resolving inter-level and intra-level data conflicts. The design of secure CC protocols in the context of con-m7J./Jo7d (Iar,ahse systems has been investigated by sevrral research groups (see [20] for a survey). In compari-SIm. Ii t t, k,attention has been given to developing secure CC 1mjt OCOIS for r-ml-time database systems. The only work r,ll~( wc are aware of in this area is a series of papers by S{, JI {It al [4, 13, 16, 17, 19] . In particular, a concurrency umt,rd protocol that attempts to balance the dual require-,,,,,,ts~Jfsm,wity aml timeliness is presented in [4, 16, 17] it is not permissible to improve the ](.:11-t llut~l)t:rl'orulauce at, the cost of security, 1II [] 3], a cmwurrency control protocol that ensures both +1'("llrltv iul(i tiiuc,liu(!ss is proposed.
For this scheme, however. the RTDBS is required to maintain two copies of each ' data item. Further, transactions are required to obtain all their data locks bejore starting execution (i. e., strict static locking).
These requirements limit the applicability of the protocol.
In our work, we consider more general database environments where all data items are single-copy and transactions acquire data locks dynamically. Another feature of their work is that it is primarily addressed towards "soft-deadline" applications, that is, realtime applications in which there is value to completing tasks even after their deadlines have expired. In contrast, we have concentrated on firm-deadline applications. The type of deadline has a significant impact on both the performance evaluation model and on the interpretation of the results, as observed earlier for (unsecure) real-time transaction concurrency control [3, 9] .
Secure Concurrency Control Protocols
As mentioned in the Introduction, assignii priorities in a secure real-time database system is rendered difficult due to having to satisfy multiple functionality requirements. In our study, since we assume that security is a correctness requirement, the database system is forced to assign transaction priorities based primarily on security clearance levels and only secondarily on deadlines. In particular, we assign priorities as a vector P = (LEVEL, INTRA), where LEVEL is the transaction security clearance level and lNTRA is the vaIue assigned by the priority mechanism used within the level. We assume that security levels are numbered from zero upwarda, with zero corresponding to the lowest security level. Further, priority comparisons are made in lexicographic order with lower priority values implying higher priority.
With the above scheme, transactions at a lower security level have higher priority than all transactions at a higher security level, a necessary condition for non-interference. For the intra-level priority mechanism, any priority assignment that results in good real-time performance can be used. For example, the classical Earliest Deadline assignment where trzumactions with earlier deadlines have higher priority than transactions with later deadlines. In this case, the priority vector would be P = (LEVEL, DEADLINE).
In conjunction with the above priority assignment, it would seem at first glance that, in principle, any real-time concurrency control protocol could be used in a secure RT-DBS and that the actual choice of protocol would be based only on the relative performance of these protocols. However, not all the previously prvposed nzl-time CC algorithms are amenable to supporting security tquirsments.
For example, consider the 2PL Wait Promote algorithm proposed in [3]: This protocol, which is baaed on 2PL, incorporates a priority inheritance mechanism [18] wherein, whenever a requester blocks behind a lower-priority lock holder, the lock holder's priority is promoted to that of the requester. In other words, the lock holder inherits the priority of the lock requester. The basic idea here is to reduce the blocking time of high priority transactions by increasing the priority of conflicting low priority lock holders (these low priority transactions now execute fater and therefore release their locks earlier).
The Wait Promote approach is not suitable for secure real-time database systems. This is because it permits the blocking of high priority transactions by low priority transactions which violates the requirement of non-interjsrymce between the transactions of different security levels (as mentioned in the Introduction, non-interference means that low WI( ill {t\ [i ;ulsac. tl<]~is should not be able to distinguish be-( \vtu,Nt II(, lJPew:uce or absence of high security transactions).
"r(, gt,llt!ridize the above observation, a real-time CC pro- 
S2PL
A secure locking-based protocol called Secure 2PL (S2PL) was recently proposed in [15] . The basic principle behind Secure 2PL is to try to simulate the execution of conventional 2PL without blocking the actions of low security transactions by high security clearance transactions. This is accomplished by providing a new lock type called virtual lock, which is used by low security transactions that develop conflicts with high security transactions. The actions corresponding to setting of virtual locks are implemented on private verstons of the data item (similar to optimistic concurrency control ). When the conflicting high security transaction commits and releases the data item, the virtual lock of the low security transaction is upgraded to a real lock and the operation is performed on the original data item. To complete this scheme, an additional lock type called dependent virtual lock is required apart from maintaining, for each executing transaction !l'i, lists of the active transactions that precede or follow 2'i in the serialization order. The complete details are given in [15] .3
Note that Secure 2PL may not perform well in the realtime domain since it does not include any real-time-specific features. We include it here for two reasons: First, it serves M a baseline against which to compare the real-time CC algorithms. Second, we use it in one of the "dual approach" protocols evaluated in this study.
Dual Approach
In thm section, we move on to discussing our new dual approach to secure real-time concurrency control. As mentioned in the Introduction, a feature of the secure environment is that there are two categories of conflicts: inter-level and intra-level. This opens up the possibility of using dijferwat concurrency control strategies to resolve the different types of conflicts. In particular, we can thti of constructing mechanisms such that inter-level conflicts are resolved in a secure manner while intra-level confiicts are resolved in a timely manner. For example, S2PL could be used for interlevel conflicts while OPT-WAIT could be used to resolve intra-level conflicts. The advantage of this dual approach ia that the real-time database system can maximize the realtime performance without sacrificing security.
At first glance, it may appear that using multiple concurrency control mechanisms in parallel could remdt in violation of the transaction serializability requirement. This could happen, for example, if the aerial ord~enforced by the individual mechanisms were to be different. A detailed study of a generalized version of this problem is presented in [21], wherein the transact ion workload consists of a mix of transaction classes and the objective is to allow each transaction class to utilize its preferred concurrency control mechanism. They propose a database system architecture wherein intraclass conflicts are handled by the cl~'s preferred concurrency control mamager while inter-class conflicts are handled by a new software module called the Master Concurrency Controller (MCC) that interfaces between the tr~tion managew and the multiple concurrency control managers. The MCC itself implements a complete concurrency control mechanism. A single global serialization order is ensured in the entire database system by using a Global Ordering from the database over this range. The permitted access range is determined by both the security clearance level of the transaction and the desired operation (read or write), and is according to the Bell-LaPadula specifications: a transaction cannot read (resp. write) pages that are classified higher (resp. lower) than its own clearance level. A transaction that is restarted due to a data conflict has the same clearance level, and makes the same data accesses, as its original incarnation. If a transaction has not completed by its deadline, it is immediately killed (aborted and discarded from the system). A transaction read access involves a concurrency control request to get access permission, followed by a disk 1/0 to read the page, followed by a period of CPU usage for processing the page. Write requesta are handled similarly except for their disk 1/0 -their disk activity is deferred until the transaction has committed. We assume that the RTDBS has sufficient buffer space to allow the retention of updates until commit time.
The physical resources of the databese system consist of NumCPUs processors and NumDisks dtis.
There is a single common queue for the CPUS and the service discipline is Pre-emptive Resume, with preemptions being based on transaction priorities. Each of the disks has its own queue and is scheduled according to a Head-Of-Line (HOL) policy, with the request queue being ordered by transaction priority. 4 The PageCPU and Page Disk parameters capture the CPU and disk processing times per data page, respectively.
Experiments and Results
In this section, we present the performance results from our simulation experiments comparing the various secure CC protocols in a firm-deadline RTDBS environment.
The primary performance metric of our experiments is MissPercent, which is the percentage of input transactions that the system is unable to complete before their deadlines. We compute this percentage on a per-cleamnce-level basis also. MissPercent values in the range of O to 20 percent are taken to represent system performance under "normal" loads, while MissPercent values in the range of 20 percent to 100 percent represent system performance under "heavy" loads [9] . Only statistically significant differences are discussed here [7] .
An additional performance metric is ClassFairness which captures how evenly the missed deadlines are spread across the transactions of the various clearance levels. To compute this we use, for each class i, the formula Fairnessi = 'cOm*'!T'OmSi'J''p"tT'an'i . In thk formula, CommitTrans;
CommttT?ans llnnutTrans and~nputl%-an~~are the number of committed transactions and the number of input transactions, respectively, of class i, while CommitTrans and InjrutTrans are thetotal number of committed transactions and the total number of input transactions, respectively, across all classes. With this formulation, a protocol is ideally fafr, if the fairness vafue is 1,0 for all classes. Fairness values greater than one and lesser than one indicate positive bias and negative bias, respectively.
The transaction priority assignment used for the secure protocols in the experiments described here is P = (LEVEL, DEADLINE), thereby ensuring that there are no covert channels since a low security transaction is delayed only by transactions of its own level or those of lowrx security levels.
4 For simplicity, our model uses the non-interference method for eliminating covert channels at the physical resources also -an alternative method is the "noise" technique mentioned in the Introduction. (, t<w 1111(1. s illv(.>t{xl ill the t ransactlion prior to its restart.
The effect of the wasted restarts problem is magnified in the secure domain for the following reason: In unsecure realtime CC, a transition that is close to its deadline would usually not be restarted since it would have high priority.
However, in the secure model, where the transaction level is also a factor in the priority assignment, Secret transactions that are close to their deadlines may still be restarted due to data conflict with a Public transaction.
Moving on to OPT-SACRIFICE, we find that there is a change of performance behavior in the secure environment in that the gap between its performance and that of 2PL-HP is more than that observed for unsecure real-time CC [9] . The main problem for OPT-SACRIFICE in the unsecure domain w= that it suffered from "wasted sacrifices" (sacrifices for a transaction that is eventually killed). The effect of this problem is diminished in the secure domain due to the access pattern restrictions of the Bell-LaPadula model: The definition of conflict in forward optimistic concurrency control is that a conflict exists between the validating transaction V and aa executing transaction E if and only if the intersection of the write set of V and the current read set of E is non-empty.
For the LaPadula model, where blind writes are permitted due to the "read-below, write-above" paradigm, optimistic algorithms will correctly conclude that there is no conflict between items that are in the intersection of the write set of V and the write set of E but not in the read set of E. In fact, it is easy to see that a validating Secret transaction will never have conjficts with executing Public transactions in this model. Therefore, the possibility of wasted sacrifices decreases as compared to the unsecure domain. Note that for 2PL-HP, however, blind-writes can unnecessarily result in write-write conflicts and cause either blocking or restarts, thereby further deteriorating its performance.
Turning our attention to OPT-WAIT, we see that it provides the best performance across the entire loading range. This is because it derives, similar to OPT-SACRIFICE, the above-mentioned benefits arising out of the Bell-LaPadula access restrictions.
In addition, it suffers neither from wasted restarts nor from wasted sacriticea. Instead, all restarts are useful in that they are made "on demand" and at the commit time of a higher priority transaction.
Finafly, moving on to S2PL, we find that it manages to perform on par with 2PL-HP in spite of not being deadline cognizant. This is due to its "optimistic-like" feature of virtual commit, which considerably reduces the amount of blocking associated with 2PL. This phenomenon is simil~to that seen in [9], wherein a conventional (non-real-time) optimistic protocol performed better than lockiig-based realtime protocols.
In Figure 2b , we present the miss percentage of the various concurrency control protocols on a per-security-level basis. This graph clearly shows how the high-security Secret transaction class (dashed lines) sufTers much more than the Public transaction class (dotted lines) to satisfy the goal of avoiding covert channels. Figure 2C provides statistics about the correspondkg breakup of the "restarts ratio" (the average number of restarts of a transaction) on a level basis. We see here that Secret transact ions are restarted much more often tharr Public transactions under normaf loads. Under heavy loads the number of restarts decrease for Secret transactions since resource contention, rather than data contention, becomes the more dominant reason for these transactions missing their deadlines.
In Figure 2d , we present a dfierent view of the transaction restarts picture. Here, the restarts of Secret trans- Fig. 2b, 2c, 2e  Fig. 2d Public Intra --Secret --Inter Arrival rate -> Finally, in Figure 2e , we plot the fairness factor of each 17C i)rotocol for the Secret transaction class. We observe rli?lr at, light loads when virtually all transactions make their ( I(,il(Hums. al I t.lw concurrency control protocols are (triv-ELI Iv) tatr. As the loading incre=es, however, the prot( VII* Iwcome itit.ressiugl.v unfair since they selectively miss t I!{, tiv;i{lllm,s (~1 %wrct, transactions to accommodate the I'1111111 rtalls;i[ti(jtts, M;it,h rty+ml to the relative fairness ,,1 L11( WI,Iltt, NWI.I Iui{, ;dgorithms, the graph clearly shows ( 11,1!( )1'' I'-\t+lT1T A.JJ(I OPT-SACRIFICE provide much bet-! (v l;llru~ss t.l]all 2PL-HP. and that, OPT-WAIT is the best ,), ,J all 11 mat SC(W,m Figure 2e that, at high loads, S2PL is In,nw fiir than OPT-WAIT. Note, however, that this is ,. Public --Secret really a 'virtual fairness" since it arises out of S2PL, due to its non-real-time nature, missing a large fraction of the Public transitions, rather than out of meeting the deadlines of more Secret transactions. In summary, for the workload and system configuration considered in this experiment, OPT-WAIT provides the lowest miss percentage, both on an overall brAs and on a perlevel baais, and the best overall fairness.
6.3

Experiment 2: Pure Data Contention
The goal of our next experiment was to isolate the influence of data contention on the performance of the concurrency control protocols. For this experiment, therefore, the resources were made "infinite", that is, there is no queueing for these resources [1] . The remaining parameter values are the same as those used in the baseline experiment. The performance results for this system configuration are presented in Figures 3a through 3c . We observe in these figures that the differences in the relative performance of the various protocols inczeases as compared to those seen in the previous , 1, , , klllx (, t(Is(, s AU 111(.r(~a. w, m the average number of trans-,1('11011s 10 dl(' s,vstelI1, thus generating more conflicts and A~](!ilt('r number of restarts.
With OPT-WAIT, however, 1ra)l>a{ t ion~ar(~never Mocked for data access. liovulg on to the performance of OPT-SACRIFICE, we ()tW.IV(, t, fuit its performance becomes even closer to that of () PT-M'.%IT as compared to the previous experiment.
The rtws{)ll for this ]S that the wasted utilization arising out of its \v,wl,tiw(r]h~.cs lnohleui has no impact here since resource 
Experiment 3: Increased Security Levels
.+ two-sect~rit,v-level system was modeled in the previous t!xiwrmwnts.
In our next experiment, we investigated the l,t,rf'orma.mx, behavior for a jive-security-level system, where dw Icvds are TopSecr'et, Secret, We afso find that OPT-WAIT's per-formance is more fair than that of 2PL-HP for every transaction security level. In summary, just as in the two-security-level experiment, we find that OPT-WAIT provides the lowest miss percentage, both on an overall basis and on a per-level basis, and the maximum fairness (this observation regarding OPT-WAIT is true also with regard to the OPT-SACRIFICE and S2PL protocols whose results were not presented here).
Experiment 4: Dual Approach
As mentioned earlier, we have experimented with a dual approach to secure real-time concurrency control where interlevel conflicts are handled by one protocol while intra-level conflicts are handled by a different protocol. In Figures 5a through 5C we show the performance of three dual systems for the same environment as that of Experiment 1. The combinations (in inter/intra order) are 2PL-HP/OPT-WAIT, 0PT-WAIT/2PL-HP, and S2PL/OPT-WAIT, which we will refer to as HP-WAIT, WAIT-HP, and S2PL-WAIT, respectively. For the sake of comparison, the performance of a pure OPT-WAIT protocol is also shown in these graphs.
Focusing our attention on the WAIT-HP and HP-WAIT duaf protocols, we first observe in Figure 5a , which compwes the overall miss percentages of the protocols, that the performance of both these approaches is considerably worse than that of the pure OPT-WAIT protocol. The reason that OPT-WAIT remains the best among them is that 2PL-HP is a wasteful afgorithm, as seen in the previous experiments, and therefore "dilutes" the effect of OPT-WAIT in both the dual protocols.
We also observe in Figure 5a that that the performance of WAIT-HP is worse than that of HP-WAIT throughout the loading range. The reason for this is that, in the secure system, the number of intra-level cordlicts are significantly more than the number of inter-level conflicts. Therefore, the algorithm which is used to handle intra-clasa conflicts has more effect on the overall miss percentage than the protocol used to handle inter-class conflicts. In WAIT-HP, it is 2PL-HP which handles intra-claas conflicts and this results in worse performance than that of HP-WAIT, which uses OPT-WAIT to handle this category of conflicts.
The miss percentages of the protocols on a per-securitylevel basis is provided in Figure 5b and the fairness factors are shown in Figure 5c . An interesting feature in these graphs is that at high loads, the fairness of WAIT-HP is greater than that of OPT-WAIT -this is the fist time in all the experiments discussed so far that a real-time protocol has improved on OPT-WAIT's fairness performance. The re-n that this happens is the following: In WAIT-HP, due to 2PL-HP being used for intra-class confiicts, many of the Public transactions ae so busy "fighting" each other that they don't ever reach the end of their execution, which is when the OPT-WAIT policy of checking for inter-claas contlicts comes into play. Therefore, Secret transactions suffer much less restarts from the Public transactions. This is clearly seen in Figure 5b where the miss percentage of the Public transactions for WAIT-HP is quite high as compared to the corresponding numbers for the other protocols.
Moving on to the S2PL-WAIT dual protocol, we find that, unlike the other two dual protocols, it performs better than OPT-WAIT, especially at lower loading levels. For example, at an arrival rate of 40 transactions per second, S2PL-WAIT more than halves the miss percentage suffered by OPT-WAIT (Figure 5a ). The re~n that this combination works well is that Secure 2PL handles inter-class con- 
S2PL-WAIT
Other Experiments
We conducted several other experiments to explore various regions of the workload space. In particular, we evaluated the sensitivity of the res~ts to the database sise, number of security levels, deadline slack factor, etc. In many secure systems, the Bell-LaPadula model of "read below, write above" is further restricted to allow only "read below", that is, blind writes by low security transactions to high security data are disallowed. We conducted experiments to evaluate the performance behavior of the concurrency control protocols under this model also. The complete details and results of the above experiments are available in [7]. Our general observation was that the relative performance behaviors of the protocols in these other experiments remained qualitatively similar to those seen in the experiments described here. That is, OPT-WAIT performed the best among the individual protocols, while S2PL-WAIT provided the best overall performance with respect to both the individual protocols and the dual combination protocols.
